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DISCRETIONARY INJUSTICE: LIMITING DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS UPON REMOVAL AFTER RE-
ENTRY  
 
Brendan Dauscher*  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Immigration in the United States is cyclical by nature.  
Attitudes towards immigrating citizens have oscillated throughout 
our nation’s history, shifting from periods of acceptance and embrace 
to periods of exclusion and neglect.1  Amidst the humanitarian crisis 
at the border, there also lies a constitutional one.  Specifically, there 
is great deference given to immigration judges and executive actors 
in cases involving removal after re-entry.2  Immigration judges are 
 
*Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2022; University 
of Pittsburgh, B.S. in Business Adminisration, 2014. Thank you to my faculty 
advisor, Professor Jeffrey Morris, for his guidance and honest critique. Thank you 
to the Law Review’s faculty advisor, Professor Rena Seplowitz for her support and 
assistance throughout the writing and editing process. Next, thank you to the entire 
staff and editorial board of the Touro Law Review for being supportive and diligent 
throughout the drafting process. Additionally, I want to give special thanks to 
Michael Petridis for his tireless efforts and thoughtful feedback throughout the 
editing process. This note was inspired by the ongoing immigration crisis and the 
humanitarian concerns associated with it.  This issue highlights the need for 
expansive due process rights for all people, regardless of citizenship. Finally, I 
would like to thank my friends and family, especially my mother and father, for 
their love and support with every goal I set out to achieve. This would not have 
been possible without them.  
1 History.com Authors, U.S. Immigration Timeline, HISTORY.COM, (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/immigration-united-states-timeline. 
2 See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 611 (2006) (“Discretion permits adjudicators to engage in individualized 
decision making, considering the full complexity of an applicant's situation rather 
than reducing it to a checklist of standard factors. It allows the agency to temper the 
rigidity of statutory rules with attention to exceptional circumstances. . . The 
decision on discretionary relief in a removal proceeding is thus a choice of the 
appropriate disposition of the case by the adjudicating official. The immigration 
1
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administrative officials who are tasked with adjudicating removal 
hearings. The power of immigration judges is vested legislatively 
through Congress.3  These judges are housed in administrative courts 
and determine if immigrants will be removed, allowed to remain in 
the United States, or granted discretionary relief from deportation.4  
The narrow issue of whether an immigrant has the 
constitutional right to be informed of the opportunity to seek 
discretionary relief typically arises during a removal proceeding after 
unauthorized re-entry into the United States.  The case at issue, 
United States v. Estrada,5 is one involving a Mexican citizen, Emilio 
Estrada.6  Mr. Estrada was a green-card holder but not a citizen of the 
United States.7  In 2009, Mr. Estrada was indicted for committing an 
aggravated felony.8  He was charged with possession of a firearm by 
an unlawful user of methamphetamine and was subsequently 
deported.9  After his deportation, he was found in the United States in 
2015.10  Estrada was charged with illegal re-entry after removal and 
scheduled for a hearing before an immigration judge.11   
During his deportation hearing, the immigration judge did not 
inform him or his counsel of his opportunity to seek discretionary 
relief.12  Discretionary relief offers immigrants a chance to avoid 
deportation proceedings and remain in the United States if they can 
show the possibility of a favorable outcome at their hearing.13  
Estrada moved to dismiss the indictment via a collateral attack on the 
underlying deportation order, arguing that the immigration judge 
violated his due process rights by “failing to advise him of the 
possibility of discretionary relief from removal under § 212(h) of the 
 
judge can choose milder or more rigid sanctions, or may choose to impose no 
sanction at all, restoring a legally deportable permanent resident to good standing.”) 
3 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (delegating to immigration judges the power to adjudicate 
inadmissibility or deportability in removal proceedings). 
4 Catherine Kim, Article: The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 
(2018). 
5 876 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2017) 
6 Id. at 886. 
7 Id. 
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Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).”14  The motion was 
subsequently denied, and Estrada appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals for review.15  The Sixth Circuit, in a de novo review, 
analyzed the attack on his deportation order.16  The Sixth Circuit 
thoroughly analyzed 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and specifically the third 
element, which was the center of Estrada’s appeal.17  The appellate 
court focused exclusively on the fundamental fairness element of the 
appeal.18  Ultimately, after reviewing other sister circuits’ decisions 
on this issue, the Sixth Circuit held that counsel’s failure to inform 
the defendant of his right to assert discretionary relief from 
deportation, in underlying removal proceedings, did not violate Mr. 
Estrada’s due process rights.19  The Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in the instant case; however, a genuine constitutional issue still 
exists.20   
Today, the circuits remain split on the issue of whether an 
immigrant must be informed of the availability of discretionary relief 
in a deportation hearing.21  While the Sixth Circuit joined the 
majority of circuits that have decided this issue, its decision 
reinvigorated the debate of whether a national policy needs to be 
adopted.  The minority of the circuits find that an immigrant has a 
right to be informed of discretionary relief from deportation and the 
failure to inform amounts to fundamental unfairness under  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(d)(3).22  This Note will argue for the national implementation 
and adoption of the Second Circuit’s reasonable probability standard 
through  a Supreme Court ruling on the issue to settle the current 
circuit split or pointed legislative action to provide further guidance 
in deportation hearings regarding discretionary relief.  Preferably, the 
former would best settle this Circuit split, however, it would require a 
ripe case and controversy for the court to grant certiorari.  
Undocumented immigrants have a protected liberty interest to 
be informed of their eligibility for discretionary relief from 
 
14 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)). 
15 Id. 
16 Id.at 887. 
17 Id. (“[T]he entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.”). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 888-889. 
20 United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 886 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 2623 (2018). 
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deportation.23  Suppression of the opportunity to be informed of such 
relief gives rise to a due process violation regardless of the regardless 
of the outcome of the hearing.24  Currently, the circuit courts disagree 
about an immigrant’s right to be informed of discretionary relief.25  
The majority of the circuits follow the statute in a textualist form. 26   
However, the minority of the circuits consider other factors when 
deciding the issue of discretionary relief.27  The majority of the cases 
dealing with this issue involve criminal defendants who were 
deported because of their criminal conviction and found in the United 
States after re-entry.  This Note evaluates the constitutionality of 
informing immigrants of their opportunity to seek discretionary 
relief.28   
Section II of this Note will discuss the relevant constitutional 
provisions and the legislative history of the broad application of these 
principles to undocumented immigrants by immigration judges.  The 
goal of broad application of Constitutional principles is to ensure 
fairness in largely discretionary hearings conducted by one sole 
arbiter, the immigration judge, as an agent of the executive branch.  
Section III will discuss the relevant congressional action taken and §§ 
1182, 1229, 1326 of the United States Code in detail.  Section IV will 
examine the cases heard before United States Supreme Court that 
deal with the application of due process rights for noncitizens and 
illustrate the importance of maintaining defendants’ rights during 
their deportation hearings.  Section V will discuss important cases 
that reflect the Circuit split.  Section VI will set forth arguments that 
illustrate the dichotomous nature of the Circuit Split. Part A will 
address the stance that failure to consider an immigrant for 
discretionary relief is not fundamentally unfair. Part B will argue that 
failure to consider an immigrant for discretionary relief is 
 
23 Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 98 (1903); see United States v. Ubaldo-
Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir. 2003). 
24 Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1047-48. 
25 Id.; see also United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2002). 
26 “Textualism is a legal philosophy that laws and legal documents should be 
interpreted by considering only the words used in the law or document as they are 
commonly understood.” Textualism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/textualism (last visited Mar. 27, 2021).   
27 United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2003); see 
also United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004). 
28 United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 886 (6th Cir. 2017). 
4
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fundamentally unfair.  Part C will argue that under the Mathews Test, 
the failure to consider an immigrant for discretionary relief violates 
the immigrants’ liberty interest and therefore is not in line with the 
requirements of procedural due process protections.  Furthermore, 
this section will highlight the paramount importance of the individual 
liberty interest and need for unsuppressed due process protections in 
contrast with the governments’ desire of financial and ministerial 
efficiency. Finally, Section VII will examine the importance of 
expansive due process rights for non-citizens.  It will also discuss the 
three-pronged test set forth in § 1326 (d) 29 and its inherent 
vagueness.  It will conclude that the United States should adopt a 
national standard implementing the reasonable probability standard 
set forth in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
decision in United States v. Copeland30 and implement the reasonable 
probability standard established in that case.31   
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Founding Fathers understood that knowledge and 
education were essential to preserve peace and order among members 
of our society.32  As Thomas Jefferson once said, “I know of no safe 
depositor of the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves; 
and if we think them not enlightened . . . the remedy is not to take it 
from them, but to inform their discretion by education.”33  Most 
founders recognized that the Constitution was in fact incomplete and 
that the Bill of Rights was necessary to preserve individual liberties.34   
 
29 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (d). 
30 376 F.3d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 2004). 
31 The Copeland standard states that if the act of informing an immigrant of the 
opportunity for discretionary relief would have given a reasonable probability of 
success then its advisement is required under § 1326 (d).  Additionally, this section 
will address two more issues.  First, the discretion provided to immigration judges 
in § 1326(d) cases. Second, the need to adopt a clear standard that ensures 
fundamental fairness to all defendants in removal after re-entry proceedings, 
regardless of where the hearing is located. 
32 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (1820) (speaking 
generally about the utmost importance of the respect for the three independent 
branches of government to avoid tyranny and emphasizing that education and 
awareness are the ultimate dispositors of constitutional wrongs in society).  
33 Id.  
34 See generally James Madison, Cong. Register, I, 423-37 “I should advocate 
greater dispatch in the business of amendments . . .  I think we should obtain the 
5
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A. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
The entire Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, 
applies directly to the federal government.  Arguably, the most 
impactful liberties are those found in the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment which states that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 35  The 
drafters of the Constitution were meticulous in their efforts and 
deliberate in their word choice.36  The subsequent generations of 
legislators  also had great attention for detail.37  Of the nearly 7,600 
words used in the U.S. Constitution and its twenty-seven 
amendments, there is only one repeated phrase,38 which is the eleven-
word phrase that appears both in the Fifth Amendment and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, “deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”39   
Ironically, while the Fifth amendment protects an individuals 
due process rights it does not require federal government to do so 
equally.  Missing from the Fifth Amendment is the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection clause.  Although the Fourteenth 
Amendment only applies to the states, the Supreme Court applied it 
through reverse incorporation to the federal government.40  The 
Supreme Court applied the Equal Protection clause to the federal 
government through a series of cases, through the Fifth Amendment’s 
due process clause.  Prior to reverse incorporation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court took notable steps to ensure that no legislature 
or executive body could impugn the rights of the people by 
selectively incorporating the protections of the Bill of Rights 
rendering them applicable to the states.41  The Court explained that 
the test for holding an amendment applicable to the states through the 
 
confidence of our fellow citizens, in proportion as we fortify the rights of the 
people against the encroachment of the government.” Id. 
35 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
36 Constitutional Interpretation, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-2/clause-
1/constitutional-interpretation (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). 
37 Id. 
38 Due Process, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process (last visited Mar. 30, 2020). 
39 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV§ 1. 
40 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). 
41 See; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 
6
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Fourteenth Amendment is whether the right protected is among those 
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all 
our civil and political institutions.”42   
While the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are textually 
different, their protections and promises apply together since the Fifth 
now ensures the protections of the Fourteenth to the federal 
government.43  This guarantee to apply the laws equally, to all 
persons, and is present in many of the re-entry after removal cases.  It 
is arguably the most important of the many promises made by the 
federal government to its permanent residents.  It is an assurance that 
the federal government will operate within the law and provide fair 
procedures as part of its legal obligation to its residents.44 
Like many provisions in the Constitution the Court’s interpretation in 
the early years, the due process clause’s legal meaning was 
consistently interpreted narrowly.45  In the late nineteenth century, 
Congress held the unconstrained power to admit or expel immigrants 
from the country.46  At this time, the Bill of Rights placed no 
judicially enforceable barrier to congressional action regarding 
immigration policies.47  During this time, the application of the Fifth 
Amendment was strict, immigration cases, and the Court gave great 
deference to executive officers such as immigration judges for filling 
the development and establishment of the record, findings of fact, and 
prompt adjudication.48  A party must have demonstrated a 
fundamental unfairness in the process in order to establish that the 
government deprived her of sufficient life, liberty, or property 
interests.49  The findings of fact were not subject to judicial review 
unless a court was expressly authorized to do so.50   
 
42 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).  
43 The equal protection clause prevents the state government from enacting laws 
that arbitrarily discriminate. The Fifth Amendment due process clause extends this 
prohibition to the federal government if the discrimination violates due process of 
law. 
44 Due Process, supra note 37. 
45 Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).   
46 Neuman, supra note 2, at 618. 
47 Id. at 619. 
48 United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2004). 
49 Ashki v INS, 233 F.3d 913, 921 (6th Cir.2000). 
50 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892); see The Japanese 
Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 98 (1903). 
7
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Recently, courts have held that immigrants who are subject to 
removal upon initial entry have far fewer rights than immigrants 
subject to removal after entry.51  Courts justify this by reasoning that 
“immigrants possess constitutional rights outside the immigration 
process and they generally possess constitutional procedural rights 
within the immigration process. But their substantive constitutional 
rights may not effectively constrain congressional deportation policy, 
and courts will apparently not protect them from being deported.”52 
 Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment guarantees immigrants, 
throughout deportation proceedings, the due process right of 
procedural fairness by affording them a full and fair hearing.53  This 
crucial Amendment ensures the protection of individual rights and 
prohibits the federal government from abusing its power over 
individual defendants during legal proceedings.  Modern 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment by the Supreme Court54 as it 
relates to immigration provides for great protections in immigration 
hearings that are currently not being observed.55  Informing an 
immigrant of her right to seek discretionary relief should be protected 
as a procedural due process right under the Fifth Amendment.  The 
burden on the government to inform the immigrant is not so onerous 
as to vastly expand the cost of administrative proceedings or 
timeliness and the benefit to the accused is incomparable.  If this 
procedural right of advisement were not observed, it could lead to 
unlawful deportation of immigrants, who have legal standing to 
remain in the United States, at the discretion of the immigration 
judge.  Expanded awareness of discretionary relief to those accused 
of illegal re-entry will not change the outcome of every removal case 
but, it will safeguard the due process protections that are guaranteed 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.   
A critical procedural right that should never be compromised 
is the right to be fully informed of discretionary relief.  Due process 
mandates that the federal government should use appropriate methods 
or procedures to ensure its actions do not deprive an individual of 
 
51 Castro v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 163 F.Supp. 3d 157, 158 (E. D. Pa. 
2016).  
52 Neuman, supra, note 2 at, 620. 
53 United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017). 
54 Neuman, supra, note 2 at, 635. 
55 Id. 
8
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life, liberty, or property.56  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments—
as well as several statutes—guarantee immigrants specific procedural 
protections in the same way that they do for naturalized U.S. 
citizens.57 Any denial of these foundational individual rights could 
constitute an abuse of discretion by the Executive Branch.58   
Earlier in the Nineteenth Century, the Supreme Court ruled on 
seminal due process cases that became known as the Slaughter-house 
Cases.59  The Court reasoned that due process is purely procedural 
and that the enactment of the law via the democratic process was 
itself,  due process on its face.60  The majority opinion, though no 
longer applicable61, took a textualist approach in analyzing the 
Fourteenth Amendment, stating that the amendment itself makes 
distinctions between United States citizenship and state citizenship.62  
This distinction supported the Court’s reasoning that the Framers did 
not design the Amendment to extend the privileges and immunities 
outlined in the Bill of Rights onto the individual states.63   
In doing so, this Court changed the course of history and set 
the United States on the painstaking case by case review to determine 
if such action by the government offends those canons of decency 
and fairness, which have come to be known as selective 
incorporation.64  However, others believe that the due process clause 
does include protections of substantive due process.  In a dissenting 
opinion, Justice Field wrote that “the Due Process Clause protected 
individuals from state legislation that infringed upon their ‘privileges 
 
56 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
57 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982). 
58 Baires v. I.N.S., 856 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 2004). (Holding that immigration 
judge's denial of alien's request for continuance of asylum hearing and change of 
venue violated alien's statutory and regulatory procedural rights.) 
59 Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1872). 
60 Id. 
61 Although the Court's decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases has never been 
explicitly overturned, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries an ideologically 
conservative Court would adopt Justice Field's judicial views, interpreting the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a protection not of civil rights but of economic liberties. 
Later, these views would blossom to provide many other unenumerated rights 
ranging from a woman’s right to choose to the right to marry freely regardless of 
gender or sexual orientation.  
62 Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1872). 
63 Id. 
64 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
9
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and immunities’ under the federal Constitution.”65  In his dissent, 
Justice Field argued that the Privileges and Immunities Clause set 
forth in the Fourteenth Amendment protected all privileges and 
immunities from state encroachment, not just those secured by the 
federal government.66  Constitutional scholars view this as one of the 
first steps toward the modern doctrine of substantive due process, a 
theory that the Court has developed to defend rights that are not 
enumerated in the Constitution.67  The Slaughter-house Cases’ 
dissent, which is now seen as the correct legal conclusion,  is an 
example of protection of unenumerated due process rights.  The right 
of discretionary relief should be treated as an unenumerated right and 
protected right under the due process clause.  Providing the person 
with this protection will ensure a fair hearing before an immigration 
judge who has quasi-judicial and quasi-executive power and can use 
them to infringe rights in an effort to promote efficiency and expedite 
results.  Similarly, it is the goal of this Note to promote that 
unenumerated rights with respect to informing immigrants of 
discretionary relief are fundamental to immigrants facing deportation 
and their continued protection is necessary for all persons regardless 
of citizenship status.  
The dissent in the Slaughter-house Cases has given rise to 
many personal liberties that we hold dear today.68  Justice Field’s 
dissent vehemently argued that the majority’s overly narrow 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment virtually gutted the 
Amendment of its protections, and this approach disenfranchised 
individual due process rights.69  He urged the Court to take a broader 
view of the amendment and encouraged the presumption in favor of 
universal individual rights.70  The language of the Amendment does 
not explicitly protect the right to same-sex marriage, religious 
liberties, or female reproductive choice.  However, it has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court to imply protections for these 
 
65 Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. at 74 (Field, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. 
67 Magna Carta: Muse and Mentor, LIBR. OF CONG., 
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/magna-carta-muse-and-mentor/due-process-of-
law.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2019). 
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essential fundamental liberties that we enjoy as citizens of the United 
States.71  
Generally, the right to be informed of discretionary relief at a 
deportation hearing would fall under the umbrella of procedural due 
process rights.  Procedural due process rights protect a person if the 
government acts in such a way as to deprive the individual of life, 
liberty or property interests.  Judge Friendly outlined some common 
types of procedural guarantees, including notice, an opportunity to be 
heard before an unbiased tribunal, and an opportunity to present 
reasons why the proposed action should not be taken.72  Judge 
Friendly’s article both raises and answers many questions regarding 
the extent of the hearing required and the balance of individual rights 
versus the expenditure of bureaucracy.73  The Court has elaborated on 
the notice requirement and stated that due process is a guarantee and 
not merely an act of legislative grace.74  Therefore, since notice is a 
part of procedural due process and due process is guaranteed by the 
Constitution and not conferred, informing an immigrant of 
discretionary relief should become a part of the notice requirement.   
Other scholars have compared the practical application of 
notice requirements to a cost benefit analysis, explaining that the 
more expensive the additional procedures will be the less likely the 
Court will require them.75  Additional aspects of the analysis include 
weighing the benefit of the interest to the individual.76  The more 
important the interest to the individual, the more likely the Court will 
require procedural safeguards to protect that interest.77  Finally, the 
more the Court believes that the additional  procedural components 
will promote more accurate and less erroneous decisions, the more 
likely it is the Court will require the procedures.78  An independent 
tribunal will provide more accurate decisions if it can use all 
available forms of relief.  Since the relative cost of the procedure is 
minimal, if anything at all, it should be found that this procedural 
 
71 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); see also Adamson v. California, 332 
U.S. 46, 68 (1947); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
72 Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). 
73 Id. at 1276. 
74 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).  
75 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, § 7.3 
at 451; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
76 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 451. 
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safeguard is constitutionally protected under procedural due process 
rights.  
Within the entangled web of individual due process issues lies 
the immigrant, who ultimately wants to remain in the United States.  
Our nation ideally strives to provide due process rights to those most 
vulnerable.  The founders of the Constitution had certain principles in 
mind when they created the Constitution.  As times have changed, we 
can now say that even non-citizens are afforded these rights in 
accordance with the Constitution’s principals.  Even though this 
particular issue is confined to immigration courts, the rights infringed 
upon relate to all the residents of the country.   We cannot lose sight 
of the individual throughout this daunting deportation process.  
Although, there may have been wrongs committed that brought the 
immigrant before this court, these wrongs do not give executive 
officials carte blanche to ignore rights of the people who have their 
entire life at stake.  Further, this is analogous to a criminal conviction 
for murder of an individual that does not receive their Miranda rights.  
This individual has admitted wrongdoing much like the immigrant 
before the immigration court.  However, in a criminal context, if this 
evidence were admitted it would be a constitutional violation and 
would be grounds for reversal.  The principle behind this analogy is 
not so much the reason the proceeding is happening in the first place 
but rather the importance of ensuring a fundamentally fair 
opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal.  If the immigrant 
is not afforded this opportunity it could amount to a deprivation 
which should result in a reversal much like that of a criminal without 
the opportunity to have been read their Miranda rights.  This 
individual often has the most at stake as she could face deportation, 
family separation, criminal charges, and a return to the dire situation 
she originally wanted to escape.79  The obligation we have as a nation 
to this particular individual is to ensure their due process rights are 
continually protected and not to neglect these essential values based 
on citizenship status.   
Procedural due process applies to non-citizens in the United 
States because the Fifth   Amendment applies to “all persons born or 
naturalized in United States . . . are citizens of the United States.”80 
This amendment confers these rights on immigrants who enter the 
 
79 U.S. v. Copeland III, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).  
80 U.S. CONST. amend. V§ 1. 
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United States legally or illegally by use of the words “all persons.”81  
Failure to inform an immigrant of the availability of a particular form 
of relief inherently abridges a privilege to a fair hearing and deprives 
the defendant of meaningful judicial review.   This is because the 
right is theoretically waived rendering the decision procedurally 
sound and therefore not subject to appeal.  Thus, this process is 
inherently unfair because there would be no grounds to appeal as 
there would technically be no erroneous items on the record, yet the 
process still serves to deprive an individual of rights that should be 
protected.  The lack of judicial review is an egregious violation of her 
due process rights that are guaranteed and secured by the Fifth 
Amendment and conferred upon the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendments due process clause.82   
B. Sixth Amendment  
Duncan v. Louisiana83 is the landmark case that confers the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial onto the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.84  It is not a stretch to analogize a criminal 
trial to an immigration hearing.  In fact, it has been argued that 
criminal procedure norms have been disproportionally included into 
these “civil” proceedings.85  Some commonalities that are beginning 
to take hold are those increasingly similar to criminal punishment.86  
The Sixth Amendment states explicitly, “the accused shall . . . be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense.”87  The injustice that is 
occurring in many immigration courts is overwhelming, and the 
concealment of potential defenses and available forms of relief in 
immigration hearings should be unconstitutional. 
 
81 Id. 
82 United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1047-10 (9th Cir. 2003). 
83 391 U.S. 145 (1968).  
84 Id. at 148. 
85 See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: 
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
469, 471 (2007).  
86 Id. (“The underlying theories of deportation increasingly resemble those of 
criminal punishment. Preventive detention and plea bargaining, longstanding 
staples of the criminal justice system, have infiltrated the deportation process.”). 
87 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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Although deportation is technically a civil proceeding, it is 
becoming increasingly similar to criminal prosecutions.88  These 
proceedings are criminal in nature because the basis for their 
deportation is a violation of the United States Code.  These 
individuals are detained pending their hearing which is generally 
never the case with civil proceedings.  Further, in these immigration 
proceedings the government is bringing the case against the 
immigrant and not an individual which is another similarity to 
criminal proceeding as opposed to civil.  Many view the deportation 
proceeding merely as a “second bite at the apple” for the 
government.89  Some have called this phenomenon the 
criminalization of immigration law or “crimigration.”90  This theory 
suggests that the government has multiple opportunities to prosecute 
alleged offenders and often if the initial proceeding results in a guilty 
plea it is seemingly “definite, immediate and largely automatic” that 
removal will follow.91  The gap between the criminal proceeding and 
the administrative proceeding has diminished substantially.92  The 
distinct lack of independent administrative review is startling and the 
melding of the criminal and immigration courts is increasing.93 After 
a conviction, there is virtually no independent review and seemingly 
the deportation order receives its rubber stamp from Department of 
Homeland Security and the individual may be removed without 
having a hearing of any kind or be presented with any form of 
relief.94  Although these hearings generally do not carry criminal 
penalties and are seen as civil or “ministerial” they afford the 
 
88 See, e.g., Austin T. Fragomen, The Uncivil Nature of Deportation: Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment Rights and the Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 34-
35 (1978).  
89 Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration 
Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. REG. 47, 68 (2010) ("We find that removal in 
fact functions as punishment and that immigration law and its enforcement 
infrastructure have changed to such an extent in the past two decades that removal 
has become a direct consequence of many convictions for noncitizens."). 
90 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic 
Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. 
REG. 639, 640 (2004) (noting that a trend toward increased convergence of the 
criminal justice and immigration control systems has been apparent since the 
1980s). 
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government the same result.95  Perhaps a worse outcome is that these 
hearings generally result in the successful punishment of offenders.96  
After the hearing concludes, it is likely the offenders will 
subsequently be removed from the United States.97  The intersection 
of criminal prosecutions and immigration courts are still increasing.  
The government has begun to attach criminal consequences to 
immigration violations.98  
The intersection between criminal proceedings and 
immigration hearings may be inevitable.  However, what is 
disturbing to many is that only the negatives associated with criminal 
prosecutions are being imported into immigration hearings.99  There 
is a distinct absence of the protections available in a criminal 
prosecution because the deportation hearings are considered civil 
proceedings.100  Some imports from the criminal system that may 
help the immigrant is the burden proof.   The burden is noticeably 
more difficult in criminal cases, as it lies with the government to 
prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Civil burden lies with 
the plaintiff to prove their own case against the defendant.  In order to 
ensure due process, we need a to import criminal due process 
protections into the immigration context.  That way the immigrant 
should be informed of his right to discretionary relief to avoid 
deportation.  This can be likened to that of a criminal being read his 
Miranda rights.  The import of criminal context in immigration courts 
should not be unilaterally negative for the accused, if the government 
is going to use criminal procedure in immigration to its advantage it 
should also import its significant defenses as well.  Since there is a 
current circuit split, the Supreme Court could accept a case and make 
a ruling to settle the split or, the legislative branch needs to pass 





98 See generally Legomsky, supra note 80, at 471-472.  
99 Id.; see e.g., Maureen A. Sweeney, supra note 84, at 78; Ramanujan Nadadur, 
Beyond “Crimigration” and the Civil-Criminal Dichotoomy—Applying Mathews v. 
Eldridge in the Immigration Context, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141, 146-147 
(2013). 
100 Legomsky, supra, note 80, at 481.  
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III. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
A. Immigration and Nationality Act 
Since passage of the McCarren-Walter Act of 1952101, the 
United States government enacted federal statutes that have made a 
number of revisions to immigration law including major overhauls in 
1965, 1990, and 1996.102  This body of legislation is known as the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  Since 1952, there have 
been multiple pieces of new legislation that have impacted 
immigration law, such as the INA of 1965 and the INA of 1990.103  
The 1962 amendment ended the use of formulas, which privileged 
immigrants from those countries that previously dominated 
immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  These 
privileged immigrants generally came from European countries and 
resulted in a disproportionate entry of European immigrants over 
other nationalities.104  The 1965 law was based on reuniting 
immigrant families and attracting adept newcomers to the United 
States.105   
The 1990 law, which has since been superseded by the 1996 
amendments to the INA, collected and codified many existing 
provisions and reorganized the structure of immigration law.106  The 
Act covers a wide range of issues from asylum to the discussion of 
discretionary relief at a removal hearing, which is the central issue of 
this Note.107  The Act defines an alien as “any person not a citizen or 
national of the United States.”108  The INA sets forth the guidelines in 
proceedings regarding immigrants and the rights they have at these 
hearings.109  The INA is vast and an all-encompassing list of its 
provisions is beyond the scope of this Note.  However, generally an 
immigrant is entitled to an expeditious public hearing, notice of the 
 
101 Pub.L. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163, enacted June 27, 1952. 




106 Immigration and Nationality Act, U. S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SER., 
https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/immigration-and-nationality-act (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2021). 
107 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). 
108 Id. § 1101 (a)(3). 
109 Id. § 1229a (b)(4). 
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proceeding, a right to counsel, a right to introduce evidence, examine 
witnesses in an effort to develop a record on which the judge will 
make the removal decision.  The process is exceptionally daunting, 
even for a person with knowledge of the law and it is virtually 
impossible for someone with little or no knowledge of the law or the 
language being spoken in the courtroom to handle the process.110  
Given these inherent disadvantages many defendants face, it is 
essential that the immigration judge be thorough and aid in the 
finding of fact.111   
Since the late 1980s, there have been many developments in 
the area of immigration law including the Immigration Nationality 
Act of 1990, which increased immigration into the United States 
making the use of § 1326(d) by immigration courts more prevalent.  
This Act expanded the number of immigrants allowed to enter the 
United States up to 700,000 and introduced various visa programs 
such as the lottery visa from low admittance countries, family-based 
visas, and five distinct employment visas.112 The decades following 
this decision observed an ever-increasing societal animus toward 
immigrants in the United States.113   
 
110 Cham v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 445 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir. 2006) 
The case now before us exemplifies the “severe wound. . . 
inflicted” when not a modicum of courtesy, of respect, or of any 
pretense of fairness is extended to a petitioner and the case he so 
valiantly attempted to present. Yet once again, under the 
“bullying” nature of the immigration judge's questioning, a 
petitioner was ground to bits. That immigration judge's conduct 
has been condemned in prior opinions of this court. 
Id.;  see, e.g., Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637–38 (3d Cir. 
2006) (explaining the behavior of the immigration judge as “intemperate and bias-
laden remarks”, “none of which had any basis in the facts introduced, or the 
arguments made, at the hearing”); Fiadjoe v. Att’y General, 411 F.3d 135, 143, 
145–46, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2005). The Court of Appeals Judge Debevoise described 
the immigration judge as “bullying” and “brow beating.”  Id. at 155. They 
explained the IJ’s conduct as “continuing hostility towards the obviously distraught 
[petitioner] and his abusive treatment of her throughout the hearing,” often 
reducing her “to an inability to respond” Id. at 145, 154. 
111 United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2004). 
112 Immigration and Nationality Act, U. S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SER., 
https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/immigration-and-nationality-act (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2021). 
113 Tisha R. Tallman, Liberty, Justice, and Equality: An Examination of Past, 
Present, and Proposed Immigration Policy Reform Legislation, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. 
& COM. REG. 869, 886-887 (2005) (“As a result of the IRCA, California saw 
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Immigrants are guaranteed the right to representation by 
counsel, the right to examine the evidence against the immigrant, and 
present evidence.114  However, the INA does not entitle an immigrant 
to an application for discretionary relief.115  Further, the federal code 
defines discretionary relief as an Attorney General’s authority to 
waive inadmissibility for certain immigrants with criminal 
convictions.116  The Attorney General may exercise a waiver if he is 
satisfied that denying the immigrant’s admission would result in 
extreme hardship to the immigrant’s spouse, children, or parent who 
is a United States citizen.117  If the Attorney General has consented to 
the immigrant’s applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to 
the United States, or adjustment of status then, at his discretion, the 
Attorney General may grant the waiver for temporary stay.118   
Ultimately, the Attorney General enforces federal 
immigration law through the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review. There primary mission is to adjudicate immigration cases by 
fairly, expeditiously and uniformly interpreting and administering the 
Nation’s immigration laws.119  The role of the Attorney General or 
his designee in immigration matters has been significant since the 
post-World War II era and continues today.120  In United States ex rel 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy,121 the Supreme Court defined the Attorney 
General’s crucial role in adjudicating immigration issues.122  In that 
post World War II case, the wife of an army veteran was attempting 
to enter the country but the Assistant Commissioner of Immigration 
and Naturalization recommended that she be permanently excluded 
given her affiliation with Germany.123  The Attorney General 
followed this recommendation and barred the spouse from entrance 
 
another wave of anti-immigrant sentiment which manifested with the introduction 
of more exclusionary legislation, including denial of services to undocumented 
persons and denial of in-state tuition to undocumented students.”).   
114 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(4). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. § 1182 (d)(4). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. § 1182 (h)(1-2). 
119 United States Dept. of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last 
visited May 23, 2021.) 
120 Id. 
121 United States ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950). 
122 Id. 
123 Id.  
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without a hearing.124  The Court held that the Attorney General was 
acting lawfully within his congressionally delegated powers and that 
he had the discretion to carry out the interests of the executive 
branch.125  Further, the Court stated that no court could review the 
determination of the political branch of government to exclude an 
immigrant, and the decision of the Attorney General is conclusive.126    
Thus, the interpretation of the INA by the Attorney General 
and members of the executive branch plays a determinative role in 
how the statute operates.  The statute’s interpretation by these 
participants provides structure to the practical application of the 
INA.127  The statute defines what re-entry after removal is and the 
rights and limitations of immigrants who are present at these 
hearings.128  The statute defines a reentrant as a person who “has 
been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has 
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, 
or removal is outstanding, and after that enters, attempts to enter, or 
is at any time found in, the United States.”129  The statute further 
provides that any immigrant who has been deported and afterwards 
enters the United States is guilty of a felony.130  The statute also 
outlines the limitations of a collateral attack against the deportation 
order.131   
The three elements necessary to sustain a collateral attack in a 
immigration proceeding under § 1326 are: the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies; deprivation of judicial review; and the entry 
of the order was fundamentally unfair.132  The statute explicitly states 
that an immigrant bears the burden of proving all three of these  
elements in order to overrule the deportation order and remain in the 
United States.133  The current circuit court split, and the premise of 
this Note, surrounds the issue of whether failure to inform an 
immigrant of the opportunity for discretionary relief rises to the level 
 
124 Id. at 540-41. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 See generally John O. McGinnis, Introduction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 21-28 
(1993). 
128 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(4). 
129 Id. § 1326(a)(1)(2). 
130 Id. 
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of being fundamentally unfair under the third prong of the statute.134  
The statute is unclear regarding the level of unfairness required to 
sustain a collateral attack on an immigration order.  The plain 
language of the statute, makes it clear that the immigrant bears the 
burden of proof in these matters.135 
B. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Acts of 1996 
Congress attempted to deal with immigration issues by 
enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act136 
(“AEDPA”) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act137 (“IIRIRA”).  The AEDPA limits the ability of 
federal courts to grant procedural and substantive habeas corpus 
relief.138  Procedurally, it requires all claims of a criminal defendant 
to be consolidated into one appeal.139  Substantively, it shrinks the 
grounds on which a defendant can make a successful habeas claim 
for convictions contrary to an “unreasonable determination of the 
facts in light of the evidence.”140   
The IIRIRA revolutionized the process of immigrant entry 
into the United States by replacing the term “entry” with “admission” 
and ultimately expanding government rights to detain and deport 
 
134 C. ALLIE SEGREST, IMMIGRATION LAW—THE CURRENT SPLIT ON AN 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT’S CONSTITUTION RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF 
DISCRETIONARY RELIEF—UNITED STATES V. ESTRADA, 876 F.3D 885 (6TH CIR. 
2017), 41 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 673. 
135 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). 
136 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in various sections of §§ 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42 
U.S.C.). 
137 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in various sections of §§ 8, 
18 U.S.C.). 
138 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), CORNELL L. 
SCH. LEG. INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antiterrorism_and_effective_death_penalty_act_o
f_1996_(aedpa) (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
139 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in various sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 
U.S.C.). 
140 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [], Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/15
2021 DISCRETIONARY INJUSTICE 935 
immigrants.141  The Act strengthened U.S. immigration laws by 
adding penalties for undocumented immigrants found in the U.S.142  
These amendments ultimately did not have the effect Congress 
intended.  Congress intended to clarify and declutter immigration 
policy by passing a new law.143  However, Congress ultimately over-
complicated an already complex area of the law by introducing over 
fifty new deportable offenses and a new form of discretionary relief 
available to a very narrow class of immigrants.144   
IV. SUPREME COURT CASES 
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to hear a case concerning 
whether all immigrants have a fundamental right in re-entry after 
removal hearings to be informed of the availability of discretionary 
relief.145  However, the Court has consistently found that the First 
Amendment, as well as the due process clause of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments , extend their protections to all persons, 
whether citizens or resident immigrants, against any encroachment.146  
The Supreme Court has held that the government must protect an 
immigrant’s due process rights.147  Specifically, the government must 
 
141 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996110 Stat. 
3009-546.  
142 Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, CORNELL L. SCH. 
LEG. INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/illegal_immigration_reform_and_immigration_re
sponsibility_act (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
143 Anthony Distinti, Gone but Not Forgotten: How Section 212(c) Relief Continues 
to Divide Courts Presiding Over Indictments for Illegal Reentry, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2809, 2822 (2006); 
144 Anthony Distinti, Gone but Not Forgotten: How Section 212(c) Relief Continues 
to Divide Courts Presiding Over Indictments for Illegal Reentry, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2809, 2822 (2006); Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility 
Act, CORNELL L. SCH. LEG. INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/illegal_immigration_reform_and_immigration_re
sponsibility_act (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
145 United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 886 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 2623 (2018). 
146 See Kim, supra note 4. 
147 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). (Kwong was a seaman who 
was deported without a hearing pursuant to an Attorney General exclusion order. 
The Court found the Attorney General did not possess the authority to deny an 
immigrant the right to be heard in opposition of an order which permanently 
excluded the immigrant.) 
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provide notice of the charges against him, a hearing before an 
impartial executive or administrative tribunal, and a fair opportunity 
to be heard.148  The Supreme Court observed that in cases arising out 
of illegal entry, the entrant is entitled to a fair trial, a fair opportunity 
to be heard, and that trial must meet the standards of impartiality.149   
In the last forty years several Supreme Court cases have made 
an important impact on this very narrow issue of the right to be 
informed of discretionary relief.  Some of these cases eventually 
changed the course of immigration law in the United States.150  Two 
immigration cases that had a particular impact on Congress are the 
opinions rendered in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez151 and I.N.S. v. 
St. Cyr152 which were ultimately codified and subsequently 
superseded by statute.  Prior to Mendoza-Lopez, § 1326(d) was only 
recognized in case law.  Congress saw its importance and thus 
worked to draft legislation that essentially mirrored the decision in 
Mendoza-Lopez.  In Mendoza-Lopez, a Mexican national was arrested 
and deported after a group hearing and was subsequently found in the 
United States.153  He was again arrested and scheduled for a removal 
after re-entry hearing.154  The Court held that the unavailability of 
effective judicial review violated the defendant’s due process 
rights.155  The Court stated that an immigrant has a due process right 
to require a collateral review of any deportation order.156 The Court 
limited this right, however, finding that the accused cannot 
collaterally attack the order if the requirements which later became § 
1326(d), exhaustion of administrative remedies, deprivation of 
judicial review, and the order was fundamentally unfair, are not 
met.157  Congress amended § 1326(d) to reflect the Courts findings 
and codify these three requirements.158  Now, an immigrant seeking 
collateral attack of a deportation order would rely on § 1326(d) and 
its elements rather than Mendoza-Lopez. 
 
148 Id. at 597-598. 
149 Id. 
150 See Distinti, supra note 129.  
151 481 U.S. 828 (1987). 
152 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 





158 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). 
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Similarly, in 2001, the Supreme Court heard the case, INS v. 
St. Cyr,159 which also had a rippling effect in Congress.  Prior to St. 
Cyr, in 1996, Congress drafted IIRIRA which limited review of final 
deportation orders and stated that district courts did not have proper 
jurisdiction to hear these appeals.160  Such appeals would need to be 
heard directly by courts of appeals.161  However, Congress did not 
make explicitly clear what would happen if the appeal was brought 
on habeas corpus grounds.  In St. Cyr, a permanent resident 
immigrant filed a petition for habeas corpus, seeking a review of the 
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (B.I.A.).162  The 
government ordered the defendant’s removal because he pled guilty 
to an aggravated felony.163  St. Cyr appealed and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.164  The court found that IIRIRA did not eliminate 
district court review via habeas corpus of constitutional or legal 
challenges to final removal orders.165  Subsequently, The REAL ID 
Act clarified that final orders of removal may not be reviewed in 
district courts, even via habeas corpus.166  Both cases are now 
superseded by statute. 
This unique area of the law simultaneously retains aspects of 
ministerial proceedings and criminal prosecutions, requires an in-
depth review of procedural due process, and the government’s role in 
the safeguard of that constitutional right.  The Supreme Court has 
long held that immigration control has been a key aspect of the 
sovereignty of the United States.167  In Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States,168 the Court held the government may limit procedural rights 
granted to noncitizens.169  Since then the Court’s decision in Mathews 
v. Eldridge170 gave much needed guidance on procedural due process 
 
159 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
160 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in various sections of §§ 8, 
18 U.S.C.). 
161 Id. 
162 533 U.S. 289, 293.  
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S.Ct. 1683, 1690 (2020).  
166 Id.  
167 Nadadur, supra note 92, at 142-143; see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 
130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).  
168 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). 
169 Id.  
170 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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review and infringement of such rights by government entities.171  In 
Mathews, the state informed Mr. Eldridge that he was no longer 
eligible for social security disability benefits because according to his 
medical records his disability ceased in May 1972.172  Eldridge 
disputed the claim, and rather than seeking reconsideration by the 
state agency he filed a federal lawsuit seeking an injunction to retain 
his benefits.173  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
injunction.174  The Court held that for an administrative procedure to 
meet constitutional guarantees, the court must apply a three factor 
balancing test.  The court must weigh three factors: (1) the private 
interest at stake in the administrative action, (2) the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures used and 
the probative value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest.175  This includes the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that 
additional substitute procedural benefit would entail.176  The Court 
engaged in a balancing test to determine if the current procedure was 
adequate compared to the alternative procedure requested.177  The 
court noted that additional administrative and societal costs coupled 
with little to no added value of the additional requirements requested 
would be too much of a burden.178   
The balancing of the Mathews factors lends itself directly to 
immigration removal hearings as there are individual interests at 
stake as well as administerial burdens to consider.  Here, the accused 
faces a significant deprivation of a liberty interest, to be free and live 
in the United States.  Weighed against the interest of the government, 
the burden and cost of implementation of ensuring discretionary 
relief is explained in all hearings where it is applicable.179  
Seemingly, the burden is rather small.  The burden on the 
government is to advise all eligible candidates of their right to seek 
discretionary relief.  However, this will undoubtedly increase the 
number of applications for discretionary relief significantly. 
 
171 Nadadur, supra note 92, at 142-143. 
172 Id. at 324. 
173 Id. at 325. 
174 Id. at 325-26. 
175 424 U.S. 319, 334-335. 
176 Id. at 335.  
177 Id. at 334-335.  
178 Id. at 349. 
179 Id. 
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Additionally, the increasing number of applications will directly 
impact administrative costs and caseloads for already overworked 
immigration judges.  The argument section will discuss how the 
importance of the immigrant’s liberty interest exceeds the cost and 
burden on the government.  
V. EXAMINING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Over the past decade, there has been an intriguing increase in 
litigation in the federal circuit courts surrounding the fundamental 
fairness element of § 1326(d).180  All of the federal circuits courts 
have a consensus on the criteria constituting what is “fundamentally 
unfair.”181  In order “to prove the fundamental unfairness of an 
underlying deportation order, a defendant must show both a due 
process violation emanating from defects in the underlying 
deportation proceeding and resulting prejudice.”182  Although an 
agreement exists on the requirements of proving fundamental 
unfairness, there is a federal circuit split on the issue of whether 
failure to inform an immigrant of his right to discretionary relief 
violates the defendant’s constitutional rights and renders the 
proceeding fundamentally unfair under § 1326(d)(3).183  
The prevailing position for the majority of circuit courts is 
that immigrants do not have a due process right to be informed of the 
right to discretionary relief from deportation.184  The courts go on to 
further state that the failure to advise does not render the procedure 
“fundamentally unfair.”185  Specifically, the Fifth Circuit best 
outlines the majority view by formulating three distinct but related 
requirements that must be met by an immigrant wishing to challenge 
 
180 SEGREST, supra note 120, at 676-677. 
181 Id.; see also United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Estrada, 
876 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 
2002); United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2004); Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425 (4th 
Cir. 2002); Oguejiofor v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 277 F.3d 1305 (11th 
Cir. 2002); Escudero–Corona v. INS, 244 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2002). 
182 Estrada, 876 F.3d at  888. 
183 SEGREST, supra note 120, at 676-677. 
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the use of a prior deportation or removal order.186  In the Fifth 
Circuit, the immigrant must establish that (1) the prior hearing was 
“fundamentally unfair”; (2) the hearing effectively eliminated the 
right of the immigrant to challenge the hearing by means of judicial 
review of the order; and (3) the procedural deficiencies caused the 
immigrant actual prejudice.187  This three-pronged test established by 
the Fifth Circuit nearly mirrors the federal code Section 1326(d).   
In United States v. Lopez-Vasquez,188 the Fifth Circuit took a 
hardline procedural approach.  Specifically, the court stated that if the 
Government followed the federal procedure for expedited removal of 
immigrants, and the immigrant did not raise an allegation that the 
Government violated his due process rights, his removal was not 
fundamentally unfair.189  In United States v. Benitez-Villafuerte190 the 
Fifth Circuit explained its definition of prejudice.  In this connection: 
A showing of prejudice means “there was a reasonable 
likelihood that but for the errors complained of the 
defendant would not have been deported” [or 
removed]. In short, “if the defendant was legally 
deportable, and despite the I.N.S.’s errors, the 
proceeding ‘could not have yielded a different result,’ 
the deportation is valid for purposes of section 
1326.”191 
The Fifth Circuit court is attempting to show that even with 
the INS errors, if there is no other reasonable result that could have 
developed from the proceedings, the deportation stands.192  This is 
most similar to a harmless error argument where although there was 
some defect in the process it was not egregious and dispositive of the 
ultimate outcome.193   
United States v. Lopez-Ortiz194 is the leading case that held 
that failure to inform an immigrant of discretionary relief does not 
 
186 United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 227 F.3d 476, 483 (5th Cir. 2000). 
187 Id. 
188 227 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2000). 
189 Id. at. 483. 
190 186 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1999). 
191 Id. at 658-59 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Galicia-Gonzalez, 997 
F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
192 Id.  
193 Id. 
194 313 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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infringe upon the due process rights of the immigrant.195  In Lopez-
Ortiz, the defendant, Joel Lopez-Ortiz, who was a citizen of Mexico, 
was convicted of felony possession of cocaine and sentenced to 
removal as an aggravated felon.196  At the removal hearing, the judge 
failed to advise the defendant he was eligible to apply for § 212(c) 
discretionary relief.197   
In Lopez-Ortiz, the court stated that the defendant was eligible 
for a discretionary waiver of removal at the time of his prior removal 
proceeding.198  However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
the immigration judge’s failure to inform the immigrant of his 
eligibility for that waiver did not render the proceeding 
fundamentally unfair.199  The Fifth Circuit in Lopez-Ortiz reasoned 
that § 212(c) discretionary relief is available within the broad and 
unfettered discretion of the Attorney General, and therefore 
discretionary relief is not a due process right.200  This circuit has 
noted that § 212(c) relief “was couched in conditional and permissive 
terms.  As a piece of legislative grace, it conveyed no rights, it 
conferred no status,” and its denial does not implicate the due process 
clause.201   Ultimately, the view of the majority is that § 212(c) does 
not grant a liberty or property interest.202  Thus, it cannot qualify as a 
due process violation amounting to fundamental unfairness.203   
The court ultimately found that eligibility for § 212(c) relief is 
not a liberty or property interest warranting due process protection.204  
Instead, the court found that relief is only at the grace of the Attorney 
General.205  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held this form of 
 
195 Id. 




200 See Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225. 
201 Alfarache v. Cravener, 203 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting Cadby v. 
Savoretti, 256 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir.1956)). 
202 See Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225; see also United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 
F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017). 
203 Distinti, supra note 122, at 2826-2827. 
204 313 F.3d at 230-231. 
205 Id.; The attorney general is appointed by the President and gives rise to the 
appearance of bias and impartiality because this decision effects a person’s rights 
and is made by someone at the mercy of the person implementing the policy in the 
first place.  
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relief is not a constitutionally protected due process right for two 
reasons.  First, that fundamental fairness is a procedural question.206  
Since deportation hearings are civil matters, immigrants do not have 
the same protections that would be available to a criminal defendant. 
Lopez-Ortiz presupposes that eligibility for discretionary relief under 
§ 212(c) is an interest warranting constitutional protection, but the 
Circuit Court disagreed.207  This court distinguished St. Cyr on a 
ground that the Supreme Court found for St. Cyr through an 
interpretation of the IIRIRA not INA § 212(c).  The Court reasoned 
that relying specifically on INA § 212(c) is solely within the 
discretion of the Attorney General and can be denied as it is not 
protected by due process.208  The court turned to the three factors 
found in Kwong to determine if Lopez-Ortiz was provided with 
sufficient protection.209  The Fifth Circuit court reasoned that the 
immigrant judge’s error did not rise to a level that would interfere 
with the three factors in Kwong.210  Thus, the hearing was 
fundamentally fair and INA § 212(c) is not a liberty or property 
interest that warranted due process protection.  
The Tenth Circuit went even further in disputing the right of 
immigrants to be informed of discretionary relief and defines its own 
extremely narrow standard of due process.211  Defining due process 
for deportable immigrants as “an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”212 injects subjectivity 
into the foundational principles of procedural due process.  
The minority of circuits include the Second and Ninth 
Circuits.213  These circuit courts recognize that the right to be 
informed of the availability of discretionary relief is a due process 
right.214  The right to be informed is supported by the reasoning that a 
failure to be informed violates their due process rights and produces 
prejudice, which in turn leads to the hearing itself becoming 
 
206 Id. at 230. 
207 Id. at 231. 
208 Id. at 231. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004). 
212 Id. 
213 See United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 
United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004). 
214 See United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 
United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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fundamentally unfair215  thus, violating the defendant’s constitutional 
rights.216  These Circuits highly contest the position advanced  by the 
Fifth Circuit as they argue this is contrary to the very fabric of 
procedural due process.217 
The Second and Ninth Circuits state that a “failure to advise a 
potential deportee of a right to seek Section 212(c) [discretionary] 
relief can, if prejudicial, be fundamentally unfair within the meaning 
of Section 1326(d)(3).”218  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit has taken a 
fairly liberal stance on the interpretation of the Due Process Clause in 
the context of Section 1326(d) and the right to be informed of 
discretionary relief.219  The Ninth Circuit stated, “we have repeatedly 
held that an I.J.’s [immigration judge] failure to so advise violates 
due process and can serve as the basis for a collateral attack to a 
deportation order.”220    
The most progressive approach to this issue of informing an 
immigrant of her eligibility for discretionary relief is discussed in the 
Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa.221  In 
Ubaldo-Figueroa, an immigrant was convicted by a federal 
immigration judge for illegal re-entry into Southern California, and 
he appealed.222  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held an 
immigrant could collaterally attack a removal order underlying illegal 
re-entry prosecution despite failure to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.223  Explicitly, the immigration judge deprived the 
immigrant of his due process rights when the judge did not inform the 
immigrant of his opportunity for discretionary relief in the 
immigrant’s underlying removal proceeding.224 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that due to the immigration 
judge’s failure to inform the immigrant of his right to appeal, his 
deportation order deprived the immigrant of the opportunity for 
 
215 Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d at 1048. 
216 Id. 
217 United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1047-1048 (9th Cir. 2003); 
see also United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004). 
218 Id. 
219 United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010). 
220 Id. at 897. 
221 364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2003). 
222 Id. at 1047. 
223 Id. 
224 Id.  
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meaningful judicial review in violation of his due process rights.225  
Therefore, immigrants could collaterally attack a removal order 
underlying illegal re-entry prosecution.226  The Court of Appeals 
further stated that an immigrant does not need to prove that he was 
entitled to relief to establish prejudice.227  Instead, an immigrant must 
show that he had a “plausible” ground for relief from deportation.228  
This court distinctly rejected the principle that discretionary relief is 
at the grace of the Attorney General.229  This court explicitly stated 
that it rendered the hearing unfair if all remedies are not proffered at 
removal hearings.230  Relying heavily on Mendoza-Lopez, it held that 
determinations in an administrative proceeding have substantial 
implications, such as criminal sanctions, and thus there must be some 
meaningful judicial review.231  This court found that not being 
informed of discretionary review amounts to improper deprivation of 
opportunity for meaningful judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 
1326(d)(2).232  Further, this court states only one plausible legal 
challenge to his removal order is enough to amount to prejudice 
because if he had known of the opportunity he could have pursued 
it.233  Thus, a immigration judge’s failure to properly inform has 
prejudicial effects from pursuing his plausible claim.   
The Ninth Circuit has established the plausibility standard 
when reviewing these discretionary decisions en banc.234  When 
reviewing discretionary decisions, the immigrant must only show 
prejudice.235  To establish prejudice, the immigrant does not have to 
show that he actually would have been granted relief.236  Instead, he 
must only show that he had “plausible” ground for relief from 
 
225 Id. at 1050.  
226 Id. at 1047. 
227 Id. at 1050. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. (“The requirement that the IJ inform an alien of his or her ability to apply for 
relief from removal is ‘mandatory,’ and ‘failure to so inform the alien [of his or her 
eligibility for relief from removal] is a denial of due process that invalidates the 
underlying deportation proceeding.’” (quoting United States v. Muro-Inclan, 249 
F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001))) 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 1048. 
232 Id. at 1050.  
233 Id. 
234 United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004). 
235 Id. at 1050. 
236 Id. 
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deportation.237  The Ninth Circuit has adopted and relied on a 
plausibility standard, which has more recently been discussed as a 
reasonable possibility standard.238  The Ninth Circuit’s 
interchangeable use indicates that plausibility and reasonable 
possibility may be synonymous.  Recent case law cites to a 
reasonable possibility standard and may even indicate less of a 
burden than the plausibility standard previously established by the 
Ninth Circuit.239  In practice, the above theories operate effectively 
identically, and an immigration judge must inform an immigrant of 
the possibility of discretionary relief if there is only a “reasonable 
possibility that the petitioner may be eligible for relief.”240  
Comparably, the Second Circuit adopted the more judicially 
manageable standard of reasonable probability for receiving 
discretionary relief.241  The primary case arising under the Second 
Circuit is United States v. Copeland.242  In Copeland, a Jamaican 
citizen, had been adopted by his grandmother, a naturalized citizen of 
the United States, and came to the United States at age twelve.243  He 
was convicted of crimes while living as a lawful permanent alien and 
was subsequently deported.244  Upon re-entry, he was again arrested 
for illegal re-entry and now faced with a second deportation 
proceeding.245  The lower court held that Copeland “really did not 
appreciate that he has a right to appeal” and dismissed the 
indictment.246  The lower court held Copeland’s deportation order 
was found to be fundamentally unfair because the immigration judge 
failed to advise of the existence of discretionary relief and this 
unfairness was deemed prejudicial to Copeland because there was a 
reasonable probability of receiving § 212(c) relief.247  The 
government appealed the decision.  
The Second Circuit held that, a defendant must show both 
procedural error and prejudice resulting from that error to show 
 
237 Id. 
238 United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2010). 
239 Id.; see also Moran–Enriquez v.  INS, 884 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir.1989). 
240 629 F.3d. at 901.  
241 United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2004). 
242 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004). 
243 Id. at 62.  
244 Id. at 62-63. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 67. 
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fundamental unfairness.248  The Second Circuit partially stood with 
the Ninth Circuit in recognizing that a failure to advise a potential 
deportee of a right to seek §212(c) relief can, if prejudicial, be 
fundamentally unfair within the meaning of §1326(d)(3). The Second 
Circuit concluded that where an alien is erroneously denied 
information and the erroneous denial of that information results in 
deportation that likely would have been avoided if the immigrant was 
properly informed, such error is fundamentally unfair within the 
meaning of §1326(d)(3).249  
In the view of the Second Circuit, the defendant must show 
that he likely would have been granted the relief sought if he had 
obtained a hearing.250  Although there is no formal level of proof for 
determining the likelihood of success at the hearing, the Second 
Circuit analogizes the failure to inform with that of the standard for 
ineffective counsel claims.251  The court stated that this analogy is 
close-fitting because it would likely result from the failure of an 
immigration judge to adequately provide the essential duties to a pro 
se immigrant plaintiff.252  Thus, prejudice requires a showing that the 
unprofessional errors of the sitting judge are the but-for cause of the 
immigrant not being granted discretionary relief.253   
The Second Circuit takes logical steps in formulating the 
desire to provide immigrants with the guaranteed protections one is 
entitled to under the due process clause.254  This approach 
acknowledges the built-in disadvantages an immigrant has when 
facing deportation.  The Second Circuits approach acknowledges the 
disparities in the adversarial system and attempts to remedy these 
discrepancies.255  However, the Second Circuit does require a 
defendant to show a reasonable probability that the immigrant would 
have obtained relief had he or she been informed of and sought a § 
212(c) hearing.256   This standard requires more than a mere 
plausibility of obtaining relief which its fellow Ninth Circuit Court 
 
248 Id. at 70. 
249 Id. at 71. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 73. 
252 Id.  
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 71. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 74. 
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requires.257  The Second Circuit’s ruling allows the balance that 
Congress initially sought by enacting these immigration statutes and 
is a better compromise than the Ninth Circuit’s approach.258   
The amendments enacted by Congress in 1996 (AEDPA and 
IIRIRA) sought to reduce immigration litigation through the 
restructuring of administrative appeals and judicial procedures.259  
The Second Circuit engages in the necessary balancing test, which 
the Supreme Court commonly engages in with regards to many 
constitutional inquiries, by requiring a higher threshold of prejudice 
than the Ninth Circuit but also realizing the fiscal responsibility the 
court has in engaging only credible appeals.260  In doing so, the 
Second Circuit uses its discretion in not overly stretching the 
provisions of the clause  beyond its constitutional limit.  The Second 
Circuit identifies the requirement of the immigrant to show that an 
immigration judge committed prejudice in the handling of the 
immigrant’s case in order to be successful.261  The Second Circuit 
analogizes §212(c) claims to that of ineffective counsel claims.262  
They state “prejudice is shown where there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for the immigration judges unprofessional errors, 
the alien would have been granted §212(c) relief.”263  The Second 
Circuits approach further cements the idea of both procedural and 
substantive fairness that is embedded in our nation’s Constitution. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
In the Argument, Section A discusses the view that the failure 
to inform an immigrant of the availability of discretionary relief is 
not fundamentally unfair under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and the majority 
of circuit courts’ reasoning is grounded in a strict textualist approach 
to constitutional interpretation.  Section B addresses the 
countervailing progressive view that the failure to inform the 
 
257 United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2003); See 
also United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004). 
258 MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43226, AN OVERVIEW OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION MATTERS (2013). 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43226.pdf. 
259 Id. 
260 United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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immigrant of the opportunity to seek discretionary relief is 
fundamentally unfair.  This Section introduces some tests that are 
currently at work in the varying Circuits and reasons why they 
employ them.  
A. Failure to consider an Immigrant for Discretionary 
Relief is Not Fundamentally Unfair 
Proponents for the majority indicate the need for a strict 
textualist interpretation of the statutes.264  The proponents emphasize 
that the statute uses no “explicit mandatory language” to create a due 
process right in discretionary relief and states the statute offers a 
“‘mere hope’ . . . of relief.”265  Advocates for the majority lean on the 
intent of Congress when it modified the Immigration and Nationality 
Act in 1996.266  Relevant legislative history was nicely summed up 
by then President Bill Clinton, who stated the legislation strengthened 
“the rule of law by cracking down on illegal immigration at the 
border, in the workplace, and in the criminal justice system — 
without punishing those living in the United States legally.”267  In 
modifying existing law, Congress sought to improve border security, 
encourage legal entry, enhance punishment on fraud and smuggling, 
and strengthen enforcement on restrictions against employment of 
and benefits received by illegal aliens.  Specifically, Congress desired 
expedited immigrant removal or deportation and achieved this by 
reducing the scope of judicial review.268  In combination with the 
legislative intent and plain language of the statute, the majority view 
seeks to interpret §1326(d) narrowly.   
The narrow interpretation of §1326(d) is unconstitutional.  It 
unnecessarily deprives immigrants of the opportunity of meaningful 
judicial review.  The mere fact of informing the immigrant of the 
opportunity for discretionary review does not entitle him to relief.  
This would not create undue burden on the immigration courts by 
causing backlogs with extended hearings. The Fifth Circuit’s narrow 
 
264 Id.; see also United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 
F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2002). 
265 United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2004). 
266 MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, supra note 228, at 1.  
267 Donald Kerwin, From IIRIRA to Trump: Connecting the Dots to the Current US 
Immigration Policy Crisis, 6(3) J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC., 192, 192 (2018).  
268 SEGREST, supra note 120. 
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interpretation of St. Cyr is incorrect. They have held “denial of 
[Section 212(c) relief] does not implicate the Due Process clause” 
and therefore eligibility for such relief is not a interest warranting due 
process protection.269  While it grounded some of its findings in the 
IIRIRA, the Fifth Circuit generally misapplied St. Cyr.   St. Cyr also 
addressed § 212(c) relief specifically by stating there is definitive 
difference between certain deportation and possible deportation. 
These differences indicate that if discretionary relief could have made 
a difference in the outcome to the immigrant it would render the 
hearing fundamentally unfair.  This further suggests that those 
immigrants eligible for § 212(c) relief should at least be informed of 
the opportunity, but, whether the court chooses to grant the relief 
sought is a different inquiry entirely.  The carve out created by the 
Fifth Circuit disregards individual rights and shows the prevailing 
injustice of encroaching criminal prosecution ideology without the 
supporting criminal due process rights.  Their opinion circumvents 
the purpose of St. Cyr which was to provide meaningful and unbiased 
review of deportation orders.  
B. Failure to Consider an Immigrant for 
Discretionary Relief is Fundamentally Unfair 
The Ninth Circuit has been known to make bold assertions in 
the defense of civil liberties and expansive individual rights.270  
Though audacious, the adoption of the plausibility standard is 
judicially unmanageable.   With respect to the goals of efficiency, 
balancing the paramount importance of properly informing an 
immigrant of due process rights, the Ninth Circuit tips the scales 
slightly too far from the center.  The adoption of a plausibility 
standard will most definitely create an unmanageable case load for 
administrative officials.  This could have more negative 
consequences than positive.  It may hamper the ability of the 
executive branch to effectively expedite hearings and keep all people 
including the immigrant safe.  The adoption of the plausibility 
standard will cause undue delay for those who have more than a 
 
269 Lopez-Ortiz, 313 F.3d at 231. 
270 See Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2020). (granting preliminary 
injunction preventing enforcement of a regulation on a provisionally certified class 
that required asylum seekers to apply for asylum in a third country that they passed 
through on their way to the southern border). 
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plausible chance of remaining in the country.  Conversely, it will 
provide those who only have one infinitesimal claim, the ability to 
seek review to the detriment of those whose chances of remaining are 
much greater.  This is a delicate balance and I do not intend to cast 
aside the hopes of those who only have a plausible claim. However, 
there are both monetary and humanitarian costs in adopting this broad 
sweeping standard.  
Section 1326 (d) of the eighth volume of the United States 
Code requires the immigrant detainee to prove one of three elements 
to sustain a collateral attack in a criminal proceeding.271  The 
majority of disputes that pertain to the failure to inform an immigrant 
of the opportunity for discretionary relief are raised under § 1326 (d) 
within the third prong in the context of fundamental unfairness.  The 
statute’s inherent vagueness lends itself to multiple interpretations, as 
we see in the analysis of the different circuit decisions.272  Although 
legislative history and executive action, from President Clinton 
through President Trump, may support a strict interpretation;273 it 
would be naïve and improper to think that this statute completely 
eliminates judge’s discretion and case by case analysis.  It would also 
be so naïve to assume that the statutory language will provide a clear 
and definitive direction in all cases.274   
Fundamental fairness is at the heart of this debate and the 
narrow interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (d) is unconstitutional.  
Given the lives of individuals that hang in the balance of one 
immigration judge’s discretion, either legislative or judicial action is 
urgent from not only a legal perspective but—more importantly—a 
humanitarian one.  The Supreme Court needs to adopt a national 
standard when interpreting fundamental fairness under 8 U.S.C. § 
1326 (d)(3).  A narrow interpretation of §1326 (d) is in contrast with 
principals of equity and human rights.  Immigration should not be 
treated any differently than other areas of the law and is no place for 
a dearth of due process especially with the import and recent 
development of “crimigration.”275  Expansive unenumerated rights 
have given residents of the nation the necessary protections from 
government overreach.  Disclosure of discretionary relief is a 
 
271 Id. 
272 See supra Part V. 
273 See supra notes 151-233 and accompanying text. 
274  Neuman, supra note 2, at 611. 
275 Nadadur, supra note 92, at 145. 
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consequential fact during a quasi-civil trial and is fundamental to 
ensure fair proceedings in immigration courts and equal application 
of the law in all venues.  To vest the ultimate power of a person’s fate 
in executive officials with broad discretion is unconstitutional based 
on the broad findings of unenumerated rights in the past.  The 
Supreme Court has found due process to apply to many fundamental 
rights, and it should be found to apply to discretionary relief at an 
immigration hearing if the immigrant has a probable chance of 
success.   
An individual deserves to know the possible remedies 
available amidst a hearing that could change the course of her life 
forever.  The law as currently interpreted and applied is 
unconstitutional.  The current process should be modified to afford 
all immigrants seeking entry into this accepting nation the same 
opportunity under the law.  The modification should be procedurally 
minor but substantively life changing.  If the detainee is eligible for 
discretionary relief, the immigration judge should be required, both 
statutorily and constitutionally, to read this opportunity aloud if the 
opportunity would have impacted the immigrant’s fate.  In cases 
where this may not be clear, it should be read by the presiding 
immigration judge to avoid the disparate impact the alternative could 
create.  The opportunity to be aware of all forms of relief that one 
may be entitled to ensure that all hearings are conducted fairly and 
consistently.  Anything short of that is unconstitutional.  
This assertion and reality for so many are unfair as a matter 
not only of law but also of morality.  The Second Circuit’s approach 
to this issue is one that should be implemented in all 8 U.S.C. Section 
1326(d) discretionary relief cases to ensure absolute fairness to all 
litigants.  The Second Circuit’s approach considers both sides of the 
argument and attempts to compromise using sound logic.276  It 
considers the narrow majority view and acknowledges the need for 
structure as a matter of law and procedure.277  This view reinforces 
the argument that an immigrant’s removal proceeding will not be 
found unconstitutional unless there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
disclosure of the availability of discretionary relief would have 
impacted the outcome of the immigrant’s fate.  This step by the 
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Second Circuit makes a necessary compromise in this area of the 
law.278   
In further review of advancing and developing the Second 
Circuit’s position, the Court does not go so far as to overstretch the 
bounds of the statute beyond its legislative intent.  It acknowledges a 
boundary as not to induce more litigation of violative due process 
allegations as does the plausible ground standard adopted in the 
progressive Ninth Circuit.  Logically, if the disclosure of the 
information would have impacted the outcome of the hearing, it is not 
too far to state that this disclosure is fundamentally fair.  The position 
of the Second Circuit allows for the nondisclosure of discretionary 
relief to establish fundamental unfairness.  If this does not rise to the 
level of a constitutional violation, it still provides the immigrant 
before the tribunal a fair opportunity at remaining in the country.  
The Second Circuit ultimately states that if the immigrant is 
prejudiced by not being informed of § 212(c) relief, then it can be a 
fundamental procedural error that does not need to be constitutionally 
mandated.279  Deportation proceedings should not be clouded by 
whether or not the immigrant should be informed by the immigration 
judge of the availability of discretionary relief.  To leave this decision 
to the discretion of agents of the executive branch, who are often 
more concerned with procedural efficiency as opposed to procedural 
rights, is unjust.  The challenge to a deportation order should not be 
determinative of whether or not one is told of a particular availability 
of relief.  All of those who are before an immigration judge should be 
afforded the full extent of due process rights including all 
possibilities of available relief.  The suggestion that an executive 
official knows better or has the right to deprive an opportunity at 
freedom is the antithesis of constitutional behavior when it comes to 
procedural due process fairness.  
C. Failure to Consider an Immigrant for 
Discretionary Relief is Violative of an Immigrants 
Liberty Interest  
The difficulty with assessing the constitutionality of not 
informing a immigrant the right to discretionary relief is that there is 
no clear rule to apply.  Mathews set forth a general standard and 
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several factors to follow, but jurisprudence applying Mathews is 
incomplete and vague with respect to immigration controversies.  
Procedural due process is situational and largely fact specific and as 
stated by the Court is “flexible and calls for such procedural 
protection as the particular situation demands.”280  This section seeks 
to examine the paramount liberty interest of the immigrant in 
preserving wealth, family ties, and a begging of life in the United 
States compared with the burden and cost on the government in 
advising discretionary relief.  This will be difficult to quantify but a 
review is necessary.   
Currently, our immigration courts face untenable backlogs of 
cases and efforts to alleviate those backlogs have been categorically 
unsuccessful.281  The ABA has noted that primarily the policies 
forcing case quotes and limiting judges discretionary decision also 
raise major procedural due process concerns.282  The ABA has also 
recommended significant increase in the creation of immigration 
judge positions to alleviate the backlog.283  They have also 
recommended the complete elimination of the administrative agency 
and the integration into an Article 1 court in order to eliminate the 
backlog.284  While these may be helpful and should be implemented, 
it is apparent that the backlog is not going away.  Currently there are 
over one million cases pending in immigration courts compared to 
only 540,000 in 2017.285  One possible solution offered by the ABA 
is to “better balance the goals of enforcement priorities while still 
encouraging the use of prosecutorial discretion.”286  This highlights 
the importance of discretionary decisions in administrative 
proceedings and supports that discretionary relief should be made 
available to help eliminate the backlog of cases.  Though there could 
be a burden on the government as an increase of applications would 
likely occur, it could have a reverse effect allowing more cases to be 
dismissed through the use of judge’s discretion.   
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The discussion of the government’s burden is only one factor 
to consider.  The more important and often overlooked factor is the 
immigrant’s liberty interest to live and remain in the United States.  
Procedural due process in administrative immigration hearings can be 
compared to many other proceedings.  Some say they should be 
compared to criminal proceedings, other liken them more to property, 
welfare, and employment hearings where less due process is 
afforded.287  Regardless, the Supreme Court has held that when a 
litigant will lose his physical liberty, it is paramount and significant 
that procedural safeguards should be recognized.288  Under the 
Mathews factors, an immigrant in a deportation hearing is losing his 
right to be free which is a significant liberty interest.  Additionally, 
the risk of erroneous removal is high.  Although the cost of the 
government may increase if additional procedural protections are 
offered, it is necessary to secure th private interest of the individual.  
The interest to live as a free individual in the United States is 
paramount.  Thus, a slight increase in cost does not outweigh the risk 
of erroneous deprivation of individual freedom.  Congressional 
reliance on discretionary decisions is unwise when such a meaningful 
liberty interest is at stake.  Therefore, there should be significant 
procedural protections offered, inclusive of the right to seek 
discretionary relief. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Due to discretion in immigration law, an immigrant who has 
challenged the proceedings as procedurally or substantively unfair 
would have a different fate depending on where they are detained and 
tried.  On one end, there is an extensive Congressional framework in 
the form of statutes and highly rule-governed procedures that leave 
immigration judges little ability from which to deviate.289  On the 
other end, the immigration system cannot be wholly rule-driven.290  
These deviations and injections of discretion can have unintended 
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constitutional consequences that could lead to inconsistencies in the 
application of Congressional law.  These inconsistencies often 
depend on where the deportation proceeding is held.  The vastly 
different approaches taken by the circuit courts require intervention 
by the legislature to more clearly express the will of Congress.  If 
Congress is unwilling to create new laws to address the situation, 
intervention by the United States Supreme Court is crucial.  The 
Supreme Court must establish a national rule of law to ensure 
fundamental fairness to all persons in deportation hearings regardless 
of where the hearing is held.  
Although many other rights have been protected by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment, it is worth noting that discretionary 
relief should also be considered in this realm of Constitutionally 
protected rights for as without it, a deprivation of liberty and life 
would occur.  The Supreme Court has often been the guardian of 
individual freedoms in our democracy and has stated “[a]s the 
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its 
principle in their own search for greater freedom.”291  It is our 
generation’s role to further these fundamental freedoms by adopting a 
national standard set forth in Copeland.  The Second Circuit standard 
for fundamental fairness seeks to reinforce the principles set forth in 
the Constitution that all persons born or naturalized in the United 
States shall not be abridged the privileges of life, liberty, and 
property without due process of law.292   
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